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Abstract—Increasing data traffic demands over wireless spec-
trum have necessitated spectrum sharing and coexistence between
heterogeneous systems such as radar and cellular communications
systems. In this context, we specifically investigate the co-channel
coexistence between an air traffic control (ATC) radar and a
wide area cellular communication (comms) system. We present
a comprehensive characterization and analysis of interference
caused by the comms system on the ATC radar with respect
to multiple parameters such as radar range, protection radius
around the radar, and radar antenna elevation angle. The analysis
suggests that maintaining a protection radius of 50 km around
the radar will ensure the required INR protection criterion of
−10 dB at the radar receiver with ∼ 0.9 probability, even when
the radar beam is in the same horizon as the comms BS. Detailed
evaluations of the radar target detection performance provide a
framework to choose appropriate protection radii around the
radar to meet specific performance requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of data traffic carried over wireless spectrum
has been increasing over the last decade with the advent of
many new applications. It has been estimated that mobile
data traffic, which heavily relies on wireless spectrum for
connectivity, will observe a sevenfold increase between 2016
and 2021 [1]. These traffic requirements have pushed the re-
search community to enable more efficient usage of the already
available spectrum and have urged regulatory bodies such
as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to open
newer unexplored bands. To implement efficient utilization of
available spectrum, many advancements have been made in the
fields of cognitive radio systems [2], [3], dynamic spectrum
sharing [4], efficient waveform design [5], and coexistence
between heterogeneous systems [6], [7]. In an effort to provide
more resources, the FCC has not only opened newer bands
in the mmWave range for licensed and unlicensed access [8]
but also some bands for commercial use which are commonly
occupied by federal, military or satellite communication sys-
tems. Examples of such bands are the TV white space channels
between 470 to 698 MHz and citizen broadband radio service
(CBRS) bands at 3.5 GHz. However, the commercial usage of
these bands is restricted and governed by policies set by the
regulatory bodies due to the presence of incumbent primary
users. In order to protect the primary transmissions in these
bands from incoming secondary transmissions, the following
three approaches are commonly used. The first method is the
use of a geolocation database which contains information about
the availability of spectrum for secondary usage. The second
approach is the use of a tiered system where a secondary
user detects the presence of a primary transmission using
spectrum sensing and utilizes the spectrum only in absence
of primary user. However, when the primary system is of
critical nature such as a military or an air traffic control (ATC)
radar, a third approach is used in which the regulatory body
declares a protection region where no secondary transmission
is allowed. The choice of this protection region is important
and critical for both primary and secondary systems. A small
protection region may result in an unacceptable interference
to the primary system, while a large protection region may
result in an unnecessary loss of transmission opportunity for
the secondary system.
In the context of the aforementioned third strategy, this
paper investigates the co-channel coexistence of an air traffic
control (ATC) radar, operating in the frequency range of 2700–
2900 MHz, with a cellular communication (comms) system.
The comms base stations are deployed in such a manner that a
protection region is maintained around the radar under consid-
eration. A comprehensive analysis of the aggregate interference
caused by the comms system on the ATC radar is presented
with respect to multiple parameters such as radar target range,
protection radius around the radar, and radar antenna elevation
angle. This analysis is further utilized to present a framework
which can determine a suitable protection radius while meeting
any given radar performance requirement.
A. Related Work
The study of coexistence between radar and other com-
mercial communication systems has been of great interest in
the research community and this field has been explored with
different variants of radars [7], [9]–[11]. Authors in [7] propose
modification in radar signals in order to avoid interference to
a chosen LTE base station. This method requires significant
cooperation between these two vastly different systems and
may not be a practical solution for tactical systems where
information cannot be shared. In [9] and [10], the authors
specifically study the coexistence between ATC radars and
LTE, and provide a mutual interference analysis to determine
an appropriate protection region around the radar. However,
these studies only consider adjacent channel coexistence and
effects of interference on the radar due to a single base station.
In [11], the authors consider the coexistence between a search
radar (2700–2900 MHz) and WLAN systems, and provide the
analysis to find a protection region around radar for single and
multiple interferers. However, the authors in this study use only
a fixed pathloss model between radar and base stations and do
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Fig. 1. Comms BS deployed in an annular region across the radar of interest;
note the protection radius around the radar
not consider the effects of fading.
This paper differs from existing literature in the following
aspects — (a) a comprehensive co-channel interference charac-
terization and analysis at the radar is presented in the presence
of multiple comms base stations, (b) large scale fading coupled
with appropriate modeling of pathloss is considered to model
the channel between radar and base stations (to account for the
stochastic nature of the channel), and (c) accurate radar beam
pattern as specified by regulatory bodies is used to characterize
the aggregate interference at the radar receiver holistically.
We note here that a similar aggregate interference analysis
can be performed for any type of radar (ATC, naval, military).
The choice of ATC radar for the current analysis is primarily
due to the fact that the specifications (as mentioned in Table I)
for an ATC radar are publicly accessible. We also believe that
the results from this analysis will serve as a motivation for
regulatory bodies to open up bands in the 2700–2900 MHz
band for potential unlicensed secondary usage.
II. COEXISTENCE SYSTEM MODEL
This paper explores the feasibility of co-channel coexis-
tence of a wide-area cellular communication systems (comms)
with an ATC radar of Type-B [12], generally located in air-
ports. A typical coexistence scenario between the two systems
is shown in Fig. 1. Since it is imperative that the performance
of the ATC radar is not compromised at any cost, comms base
stations (BS) are deployed beyond a certain distance from the
radar known as the protection radius (Rmin). Distance beyond
which the comms BS have no significant impact on the radar
performance is denoted as Rmax. The analysis in this paper
characterizes the impact of protection radius on preserving the
radar target detection performance, and provides a framework
to answer the question - how close can the comms BS get
to the radar before the latter’s performance starts deteriorating
beyond acceptable limits?
This work considers a ground-based ATC radar of Type-B
with operating parameters as specified in Table I. The radar
uses a parabolic reflector and has a horizontal scan of 360◦ (it
does not have a vertical scan). The specifications of coexisting
comms BS and channel modeling are listed in Table II. The
following system model and associated analysis assume that
the interference from comms BS to radar is primarily from
downlink transmissions in the same channel as the radar.
TABLE I. ATC TYPE-B RADAR SPECIFICATIONS
Operating Parameters Notation Value
Center Frequency f 2900 MHz
Wavelength λ 0.103 m
Transmit Power PS 1.32 MW
Noise Power PN 10log(kTB) + NF dB
Boltzmann’s constant k 1.38x10−23 J/K
Temperature T 290 K
Channel Bandwidth B 10 MHz
Receiver Noise Figure NF 3 dB
Radar Cross Section Ω 100 m2
Interference-to-Noise Ratio I/N −10 dB
Antenna Parameters
Radiation Pattern g(φ) ITU-R M.1851
Pattern Type - Cosecant-squared
Main Beam Gain GT 33.5 dBi
3-dB Beamwidth (Azimuth) - 2◦
3-dB Beamwidth (Elevation) - 4.5◦
Side Lobe Level - 7.3 dBi
Antenna Height hR 8 m
TABLE II. COMMS BS SPECIFICATIONS AND CHANNEL MODELING
Operating Parameters Notation Value
Transmit Power PL 30 dBm EIRP
Antenna Height hBS 30 m
Channel Bandwidth B 10 MHz
Pathloss Model ρ Extended HATA Model
Environment - Outdoor Urban
Fading F Log-normally distributed
Std deviation of fading σ 8 dB
III. AGGREGATE INTERFERENCE MODELING
The modeling of interference from comms BS to radar re-
quires attention due to large distance (typically in orders of tens
of kilometers) between the two. Owing to this large distance,
the propagation environment and received signal strength will
be predominantly impacted by pathloss and large-scale fading
due to shadowing from obstacles, and not by small-scale
fading. The following subsections describe the pathloss and
fading models used in the current analysis followed by an
analytical characterization of the aggregate comms interference
at the radar receiver.
A. Pathloss and fading Model
This work uses the extended HATA (eHATA) model in
point-to-point mode to compute the median transmission loss
between a comms BS and the intended radar receiver. The
eHATA model is valid for the set of parameters mentioned
in Table III. The comms BS are assumed to be deployed in
an outdoor urban region. The median pathloss for a link of
distance r km is determined by the following set of equations
[13] —
ρ(dB) =30.52 + 16.81 log(f) + 4.45 log(f)2+
(24.9− 6.55 log(hBS)) log(Rbp) + 10n log
(
r
Rbp
)
+ 13.82 log
(
200
hBS
)
+ a(3)− a(hR) + FSL(f,R)
where
• Rbp is the break point distance
Rbp =
(
102nh
abm(f, 1)
abm(f, 100)
) 1
(nh−nl)
,
TABLE III. RANGE OF VALID PARAMETERS FOR EHATA MODEL
Quantity Valid Range
Center Frequency 1500 MHz− 3000 MHz
Link Distance 1 km− 100 km
Transmitter Height 30 m− 200 m
Receiver Height 1 m− 10 m
• abm is the frequency extrapolated basic median trans-
mission attenuation with respect to free space,
• nl(hBS) captures the base station height dependence
of the lower distance range power law exponent of
the median attenuation relative to free space
nl(hBS) = 0.1(24.9− 6.55 log hBS),
• nh is the higher distance range power law exponent
of the median attenuation relative to free space,
• n denotes the modified pathloss exponent
n =
{
0.1(24.9− 6.55 log hBS), if 1 km ≤ r ≤ Rbp
2(3.27 log hBS − 0.67(log hBS)2 − 1.75), if r ≥ Rbp ,
• a(hR) represents radar reference height correction, and
• FSL denotes the free space loss at distance R
R =
√
(r × 103)2 + (hBS − hR)2.
Typical fading models such as exponential or Rayleigh
model do not accurately capture the observed fading in the
link between comms BS and radar. This paper models the
fading in the link between a comms BS and the radar as a
log-normal random variable to capture the effect of large-scale
fading due to the relatively large distance between the two.
Similar reasoning can be applied to model the fading between
the radar and its intended target as well, since the latter is
typically located tens of kilometers away from the former.
B. Interference Model
Analyzing the aggregate interference at the radar receiver
due to comms BS transmissions is an interesting problem,
particularly due to the fact that the fading between the two
is modeled as a log-normal random variable. The quantity of
interest at the radar receiver is the distribution of signal to
interference noise ratio (SINR) since the radar target detection
performance is characterized by the attained SINR. The SINR
at the radar receiver can be modeled as —
SINR =
PSGTΩλ2FR
(4pi)3R4T
PN +
K∑
k=1
PBSρ(rk)FBSg(φk)
(1)
where
• RT is the distance of the target from the radar (radar
range),
• K denotes the number of comms BS,
• rk is the distance of kth BS from the radar receiver,
• g(φk) is the gain of the radar beam at the kth BS
location, and
Horizon
Radar
θ
(Angle of elevation)
Fig. 2. Radar with cosecant-square beam pattern operating at an elevation
angle of θ relative to the horizon
• FR and FBS represent the fading random variables
between radar-target and BS-radar respectively.
The elevation and azimuth beam patterns of the radar beam
are generated based on the model specified in [14]. Due to
the narrow 3-dB elevation beamwidth of 4.5◦, the angle of
elevation of the radar beam plays an important role in modeling
the aggregate interference since the beam gain falls steeply
within the main lobe. A representative diagram describing the
elevation angle (θ) of radar beam with respect to the horizon
is shown in Fig. 2. If the radar beam is in the same horizon
as the comms BS (that is, if θ = 0◦), then interference at
the radar receiver from the comms BS would be magnified
by the higher beam gain. A discussion on how the elevation
angle of radar beam relative to the horizon impacts radar target
detection performance is given in section IV-D.
The aggregate interference in the denominator of eq. 1 is a
sum of uncorrelated log-normal random variables, which has
been analytically characterized by the authors of [15]. Omitting
the derivation in the interest of space, the distribution of SINR
at the radar receiver can be described as —
P[SINR < T ] = 1−Q
(
10 log T + 10 log Λ
σ¯
)
(2)
where:
Λ =
K∑
k=1
10(tk−ti)/10 +
1
γ
tk = PBS(dBm)− ρ(rk) + g(φk)
ti = 10 log(PR)− 40 log(RT)
PR =
PSGTΩλ2
(4pi)3R4T
, γ =
PR
R4TPN
σ¯ = σ2 +
K∑
k=1
λ2kσ
2, λk =
10(tk−ti)/10
Λ
Once the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of SINR
from eq. 2 at the radar receiver has been characterized, its
detection performance can be quantified in terms of expected
probability of target detection (E[Pd]) as follows —
Pd|SINR = x = Q(
√
2× (SINR = x),√Pfa) (3)
E[Pd] =
∑
SINR = x
Pd|SINR = xpSINR = x (4)
where
• Q(a,b) is the Marcum’s Q function defined as
Q(a,b) =
∫ ∞
b
r exp
(
−r
2 + a2
2
)
I0(a, r) dr,
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Fig. 3. Distribution of SINR at radar receiver for different radar ranges; protection radius (Rmin) around the radar is the closest distance at which a comms BS
may be deployed from the radar
• I0(a, r) is a modified Bessel function,
• Pd|SINR = x is the probability of detection when SINR
= x,
• Pfa is the desired probability of false alarm, and
• pSINR = x is the probability mass function of SINR
obtained from its CDF.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section first presents the methodology used for obtain-
ing numerical results, and then provides a detailed discussion
along with key takeaways based on these results.
A. Methodology
The operating parameters of radar and comms BS involved
in the analysis are listed in Table I and II respectively. The in-
terfering comms BS are deployed in an annular region around
the radar of interest (as described in Fig. 1) in such a way
that transmissions from one BS reach any other BS at a power
less than −62 dBm with a probability of 0.9. This technique is
adopted to ensure that comms BS do not deleteriously interfere
with each others’ transmissions. Monte Carlo simulations are
carried out by randomly deploying the comms BS using the
aforementioned strategy for different protection radii around
radar and the distribution of SINR (eq. 2) at the radar receiver
is averaged out over 10,000 trials. In the interest of tractability
of analysis, the value of Rmax is chosen to be 200 km. This
is a justifiable assumption as the aggregate interference from
comms BS located more than 200 km away from the radar will
be extremely low at the radar receiver (because of the high
pathloss suffered by the transmissions from such comms BS) .
After obtaining the averaged-out CDF of SINR, the impact of
comms interference on the radar performance is quantified by
evaluating the expected probability of target detection of radar
(given by eq. 3 and eq. 4) for different false-alarm probabilities.
In the following discussion of results, the co-channel
interfering comms BS are assumed to be in the same horizon
as the radar beam, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
B. Distribution of SINR
The CDF of SINR at the radar receiver averaged over
10,000 Monte-Carlo runs for different target ranges and pro-
tection radii are plotted in Fig. 3. The fundamental protection
criterion that needs to be achieved at the radar receiver, as
specified by regulatory authorities, is an interference-to-noise
ratio (INR) of at least INRthr = −10 dB [16]. In other words,
the radar can tolerate the comms interference as long as the
aggregate interference is not substantial enough to violate the
INR protection specification. Therefore, the minimum SINR
threshold to be achieved at the radar receiver corresponding to
the INR requirement can be computed as —
SINRthr =
PSGTΩλ2
(4pi)3R4T
(1 + 10INRthr/10)× PN (5)
where PN represents the noise power and RT denotes the radar
target range. In Fig. 3, the SINR threshold corresponding
to a target range is plotted in bold. If the observed SINR
at the radar receiver exceeds SINRthr for a certain target
range and protection radius with high probability, then the
comms interference to radar in this scenario is deemed to be
unobjectionable. In the interest of completeness of analysis,
the distribution of SNR at the radar receiver in the absence of
any comms interference is also plotted in Fig. 3.
It can be seen consistently across different radar ranges
in Fig. 3 that the observed SINR at the radar receiver exceeds
the required SINR threshold ∼ 70% of the time even when the
protection radius is as close as 30 km. This observation holds
for any radar range since the aggregate interference effected on
the radar by comms BS deployment at a particular protection
radius is the same regardless of the radar target range (RT), that
is, the aggregate interference plus noise power is independent
of RT (denominator of eq. 5). Hence, if the INR protection
criterion is satisfied by a comms BS deployment at a certain
protection radius, the criterion will be met for any radar range
at the same protection radius.
The results in Fig. 3 indicate that if comms BS are deployed
with a protection radius of 50 km around the radar, the effective
interference at the radar receiver will be within tolerable limits
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Fig. 4. Variation of the expected value of probability of target detection
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false alarm probabilities (Pfa) - the radar beam at an elevation angle of 5◦
from the horizon
more than 90% of the time (i.e, with probability 0.9). If the
latter requirement (that is the percentage of time aggregate
interference is within acceptable threshold) can be relaxed,
the protection radius around the radar can be correspondingly
shrunk to as low as 30 km and still result in aggregate interfer-
ence at the radar that is within acceptable limits more than 70%
of the time. Hence, such analysis and observations can provide
useful guidelines regarding the choice of protection radius
around the radar in order to attain a certain probability that
aggregate interference will not exceed the maximum tolerable
threshold.
C. Radar Target Detection Performance
Although meeting the INR requirement at the radar receiver
would ‘protect’ the radar from detrimental interference from
the comms system, it is worthwhile to investigate and quantify
the impact of comms interference on the radar target detection
performance. The probability of target detection achieved by
a radar is related to the SINR at the radar receiver by eq. 3.
Since this work assumes fading to be random, the distribution
of SINR at the radar receiver is characterized and hence the
expected value of probability of target detection by radar is
computed using the eq. 4. Note that the probability of target
detection is a function of the desired probability of false alarm.
Fig. 4 describes the variation of expected probability of
target detection by the radar computed using the CDF of SINR
obtained by averaging the Monte Carlo trials for different
false alarm probabilities (Pfa). When Pfa = 10−6, it is
observed from Fig. 4 that more than 90% target detection
probability is achieved when the radar range is 20 km and
the protection radius is as low as 20 km. It is also seen that
a detection probability of at least 80% can be attained when
the radar range is 40 km by maintaining a protection radius
of 60 km around the radar. Note that the curves approach
probability of detection of 1 with increasing protection radius
since the transmissions from interfering comms BS suffer
higher pathloss at larger protection radii. To achieve a constant
target detection probability across increasing radar ranges, the
protection radius has to be correspondingly increased. This is
evident from the fact that to maintain a detection probability of
90%, a protection radius of ∼ 80 km around the radar suffices
for a radar range of 40 km but it has to be increased to ∼ 150
km when the radar range is 60 km.
If a false alarm probability greater than 10−6 is defensible,
better probability of target detection is achieved by the radar.
As an illustration, consider detection performance of the radar
when the radar target range is 40 km and protection radius
is 30 km. The radar detects the target just above 50% of the
time when Pfa = 10−6 but the performance steadily improves
as the requirement on Pfa is made less stringent, reaching
up to 70% detection probability when a Pfa of up to 10−3
can be tolerated. Similar improvements are seen in detection
performance of targets at different ranges and protection radii.
D. Effect of Radar Beam Elevation Angle
The discussion till now has been under the consideration
that the interfering comms BS are on the same horizon as
the radar beam, that is, the elevation angle of the radar beam
relative to the horizon is 0◦. Due to the narrow 3-dB elevation
beamwidth of 4.5◦, the angle of elevation of the radar beam
plays an important role in modeling the aggregate comms
interference at the radar receiver since the beam gain falls
steeply within the main lobe. As an illustration, the variation
of expected probability of target detection by the radar when
the radar beam is at an elevation angle of 5◦ relative to the
horizon is shown in Fig. 5. Comparing the plots in Fig. 4
and Fig. 5 corresponding to each false alarm probability, it is
consistently seen that there is a drastic improvement in target
detection performance - with gains as high as 300% in some
cases. Thus, if the comms BS are not located in the same
horizon as the radar beam, the impact on radar target detection
performance is benign compared to when the comms BS are
in the same horizon. In other words, if the radar main beam
is tilted up relative to the horizon in which the comms BS are
located, then the BS can maintain a small protection radius
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km and desired Pfa = 10−6
around the radar and still not cause harmful impact on the
radar target detection performance.
This observation is further corroborated by Fig. 6 in which
the variation of expected probability of target detection by
the radar is plotted for different elevation angles of the radar
beam with respect to the horizon (as described in Fig. 2). The
radar target range is fixed at 60 km and the required false
alarm probability at 10−6. It is evident from Fig. 6 that the
radar target detection performance improves appreciably with
increasing elevation angle. For instance, to achieve a detection
probability of 0.9 for a radar range of 60 km, the comms BS
have to maintain a protection radius of ∼ 150 km away from
the radar when the beam is in the same horizon as the comms
BS but this radius can be shrunk to as low as 50 km when the
elevation angle of the radar beam is 5◦ relative to the horizon.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the feasibility of coexistence be-
tween an air traffic control (ATC) radar, generally stationed
in airports, and a wide area wireless communication (comms)
system. A comprehensive analysis of interference caused by
the comms system on the ATC radar is presented with respect
to multiple parameters such as radar range, protection radius,
and radar antenna elevation angle relative to the horizon. The
analysis suggests that maintaining a protection radius of 50 km
around the radar will guarantee the required INR protection
criterion (= −10 dB) with comms interference at the radar
receiver more than 90% of the time, even when the radar
beam is in the same horizon as the interfering comms BS. An
evaluation of radar target detection probability indicates that
better detection performance is achieved when a higher false
alarm probability can be tolerated and/or when the radar main
beam is tilted at an elevation angle with respect to the horizon
(because of the narrow 3-dB elevation beamwidth of the radar
beam). These observations suggest that the protection radius
around the radar can be trimmed without compromising its
detection performance. The analysis presented in this paper can
hence be used as a general framework to choose a protection
radius around any kind of radar to meet a specified detection
performance requirement, as long as the radar specifications
are known. The choice of ATC radar for the current analysis is
essentially because of the easy accessibility of the radar spec-
ifications. The results from the current modeling and analysis
can also serve as motivation for regulatory bodies to open up
bands in the 2700–2900 MHz range for potential unlicensed
secondary operation. Future directions and extensions of this
work may include adaptive power control of the interfering
comms BS in order to decrease the protection radius around
the radar, and investigating MAC-level scheduling algorithms
to facilitate harmonious coexistence between the two systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported in part by a grant from the U.S.
Office of Naval Research (ONR) under grant number N00014-
15-1-2168. The work of S. Kompella is supported directly by
the Office of Naval Research.
REFERENCES
[1] “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic
Forecast Update, 2016–2021,” Cisco, White paper. [Online]. Available:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
visual-networking-index-vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-520862.html
[2] J. Mitola and G. Q. Maguire Jr., “Cognitive radio: making software
radios more personal,” IEEE Trans. Prof. Commun., vol. 6, no. 4, pp.
13–18, Aug. 1999.
[3] S. Haykin, “Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communica-
tions,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 201–220, Feb.
2005.
[4] J. Peha, “Approaches to spectrum sharing,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 10–12, Feb 2005.
[5] F. Schaich and T. Wild, “Waveform contenders for 5gofdm vs. fbmc
vs. ufmc,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on Communications, Control and
Signal Processing (ISCCSP). IEEE, 2014, pp. 457–460.
[6] R. Zhang, M. Wang, L. X. Cai, Z. Zheng, X. Shen, and L.-L. Xie, “Lte-
unlicensed: the future of spectrum aggregation for cellular networks,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 150–159, 2015.
[7] A. Khawar, A. Abdel-Hadi, and T. C. Clancy, “Spectrum sharing
between s-band radar and lte cellular system: A spatial approach,”
in Proc. IEEE Symp. on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access
Networks (DySPAN). IEEE, 2014, pp. 7–14.
[8] Y. Niu, Y. Li, D. Jin, L. Su, and A. V. Vasilakos, “A survey of millimeter
wave communications (mmwave) for 5g: opportunities and challenges,”
Wireless Networks, vol. 21, no. 8, pp. 2657–2676, 2015.
[9] M. I. Rahman and J. S. Karlsson, “Feasibility evaluations for secondary
lte usage in 2.7–2.9 ghz radar bands,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. on Personal,
Indoor and Mob. Commun. (PIMRC). IEEE, 2011, pp. 525–530.
[10] H. Wang, J. Johnson, C. Baker, L. Ye, and C. Zhang, “On spectrum
sharing between communications and air traffic control radar systems,”
in 2015 IEEE Radar Conference (RadarCon), May 2015, pp. 1545–
1550.
[11] F. Hessar and S. Roy, “Spectrum sharing between a surveillance radar
and secondary wi-fi networks,” IEEE Trans. Aerosp. Electron. Syst.,
vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 1434–1448, June 2016.
[12] “Characteristics of non-meteorological radiolocation radars, and char-
acteristics and protection criteria for sharing studies for aeronautical
radionavigation and radars in the radiodetermination service operating
in the frequency band 2700-2900 MHz,” Recommendation ITU-R
M.1464-2, Feb. 2015.
[13] E. Drocella, J. Richards, R. Sole, F. Najmy, A. Lundy, and P. McKenna,
“3.5 ghz exclusion zone analyses and methodology,” Tech. Rep., 2015.
[14] ITU-R, “Mathematical models for radiodetermination radar systems
antenna patterns for use in interference analyses,” Tech. Rep., 2009.
[15] F. Berggren and S. B. Slimane, “A simple bound on the outage proba-
bility with lognormally distributed interferers,” IEEE Communications
Letters, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 271–273, 2004.
[16] F. H. Sanders, R. L. Sole, B. L. Bedford, D. Franc, and
T. Pawlowitz, “Effects of RF interference on radar receivers,” U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, NTIA Technical Report TR-06-444, Sep. 2006.
[Online]. Available: https://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/publications/download/
TR-06-444.pdf
